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ARTICLE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY: STATES AND TRANSNATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
Vicki C. Jackson1 
Human dignity has become an important part of the 
transnational vocabulary of constitutionalism and human 
rights. The Preamble of the United Nations Charter expresses 
belief in "the dignity and worth of the human person."2 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been described by a 
leading scholar as part of the "large family of dignity-based 
rights" adopted after World War II.3 Expressed in these 
foundational U.N. documents, human dignity also plays an 
important role in the jurisprudence of several nations in Europe, 
including Germany.4 
1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. With thanks to Alida 
Dagostino and Amber Dolman for excellent research assistance, and to Judith Resnik 
and Bob Taylor for helpful comments. 
2. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. 
3. MARy ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW 175 (2001); see Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217(A) (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 127, at 
71, U.N. Doc. N810 (1948). 
4. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 1, § 1 (F.R.G.) (German Basic Law provision that 
human dignity is "inviolable"); see also G.P. Fletcher, Human Dignity As a Constitutional 
Value, 22 U. W. ONTARIO L. REV. 171 (1984) ("No one would question whether the 
protection of human dignity was a primary task of contemporary legal culture," 
especially in Europe and North America.); c(., e.g., American Declaration of the Rights 
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The U.S. Constitution does not refer specifically to human 
dignity. 5 Yet there are some cognate concepts in the 
Constitution's text, such as the ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments, the protections of the due process clause, and 
others that have been developed in the U. S. Supreme Court's 
constitutional jurisprudence.6 The phrase "human dignity" 
(according to searches in both Lexis and Westlaw) makes its 
first appearance in the U.S. Reports in 1946, in Justice 
Murphy's dissent in In re Yamashita. 7 This post-World War II 
and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official Rec., OEAlSer.L.NIII.82 doc.6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992) 
(adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948» (beginning 
with: "The American peoples have acknowledged the dignity of the individual .... "; 
followed by Preamble, beginning: "All men are born free and equal, in dignity and in 
rights .... "), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
INTER·AMERICAN SYSTEM, available at http://www.cidh.oas.orglbasic.htm; African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CABILEG/67/3IRev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1981) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) 
("Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human 
being .... "). 
5. Human beings are referred to in the U.s. Constitution as "persons," "citizens," 
"residents," "accused," "subjects [of foreign states)," and "the people"-but not as "human 
beings." The word "dignity" does not appear. 
6. Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law, in 
DIETER SIMONIMANFRED WEISS (HRSG.), ZURE AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS, LIBER 
AMICORUM SPIROS SIMITIS 249 (NomosVeriagsgesellschaft, Baden·Baden 2000) 
(explanation of many areas of U.S. constitutional law in which the idea of human 
dignity, albeit underdeveloped, plays a role). 
7. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). The Court there 
upheld the authority of a military commission to try and sentence to death a defeated 
Japanese general for failing to prevent war crime activity by troops under his command. 
Justice Murphy, dissenting, praised the Court for rejecting the government's argument 
that there was no role for judicial review of such proceedings through habeas corpus, and 
dissented on the grounds that the proceedings had been unfairly conducted and that the 
charge against General Yamashita was not one of a war crime recognized by 
international law. In that context, he wrote: 
If we are ever to develop an orderly international community based upon a 
'recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost importance that the necessary 
punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly 
stigma of revenge and vindictiveness. 
Id. at 29. Justice Murphy had earlier invoked "the dignity of the individual" in his 
stirring dissent in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 240 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). "Human dignity" was referred to by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring 
opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 
and by Justice Murphy again in dissent on the standard of review for the denial of 
exemptions from selective service in Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 458 (1947) 
(Murphy, J., dissenting). The first appearance of the phrase "human dignity" in a 
majority opinion appears to have been in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) 
(condemning the use of "force so brutal and so offensive to human dignity in securing 
evidence from a suspect" as inconsistent with the Due Process clause). In dozens of cases 
decided since 1946, members of the Court have invoked the concept of or used the words 
"human dignity," sometimes in dissent, see, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice Jackson's concerns to protect "'the dignity 
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appearance is consistent with the emergence of "human dignity" 
as a distinctive feature of western constitutionalism after the 
war. Although some members of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
postwar period have embraced human dignity as a motivating 
principle for the U.S. Bill of Rights,S the role of the concept of 
"human dignity" in the Court's jurisprudence is episodic and 
underdeveloped.9 
Expressed in such constitutional systems as Germany's,lO 
and personality' of the individual" expressed in his separate concurrence in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942», and often in connection with Eighth Amendment 
claims, see, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 270, 306 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738, 742 
(2002) (describing cruel treatment of handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post for long 
periods as inconsistent with his human dignity and finding violation of Eighth 
Amendment), and other criminal procedure questions, see, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 644 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Fourth 
Amendment issue). It has appeared as well in connection with free speech claims, see, 
e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 781·82 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), and, although not referred to as such in the Court's abortion decisions in the 
1970s and 1980s, by the 1990s, human dignity is invoked in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion); id. at 916, 920 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), and also in the "right to die" case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990); id. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For 
an early, detailed analysis of the Court's use of the term "dignity" in connection with the 
rights of individuals, see Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right, 27 
HOWARD L. J. 145, 150·62 (1984). For further discussion of the concept of human dignity 
in the Court's decisions, see Neuman, supra note 6. For a comparative analysis of the 
U.S. Court's concept of "dignity," as applied to individuals and to government entities, 
see Judith Resnik & Julie Chi·hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of 
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003). 
8. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity and the 
Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN 
VALUES 151 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., Cornell 1992) (discussing Chief 
Justice Earl Warren and human dignity); Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and 
Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra, at 220·256 (discussing 
judicial development of rights related to human dignity). 
9. The concept of dignity played an important role in the Court's recent decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478, 2482 (2003) (holding that state ban on sodomy 
violates Due Process clause). A number of opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court treat 
"human dignity" as a concept inherent in the Eighth Amendment, as well as decisions 
respecting individual autonomy in decision making about intimate matters. See supra 
note 7. Although U.S. human rights law markedly diverges from that of much of the 
international community on the death penalty, further study would be needed to 
determine the degrees of convergence and divergence in its approach to other human 
rights issues. For a very helpful discussion of convergence and divergence between 
international human rights norms and domestic constitutional norms, see Gerald 
Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1863 (2003). 
10. As Professor Klug pointed out in this journal last year, human dignity also plays 
an important role in the constitutional jurisprudence of South Africa, as well as many 
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human dignity is a core component of constitutional juris-
prudence in a constitutional system which also incorporates 
obligations of social solidarity (and government support of 
positive welfare) not found in the U.S. Constitution. In 
Germany the right to human dignity is understood as the most 
basic and foundational of rights, with both negative and positive 
implications for how the state should act.!1 In the United 
States, by contrast, notions of affirmative obligations to indi-
viduals on the part of the government have been rejected, not so 
much for lack of textual tools,12 but out of a set of constitutional 
commitments developed over time. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has been slower than some other 
national courts to become familiar with and discuss, distinguish, 
or borrow from related constitutional approaches of other 
nations and systems. The growth in transnational judicial 
discourse, especially on constitutional issues relating to human 
rights, has been remarked by many.13 National courts in 
Argentina, Botswana, Canada, Germany, India, South Africa, 
and elsewhere not infrequently refer to the constitutional 
jurisprudence of other nations in resolving domestic con-
stitutional questions. Although such references are not unheard 
other tribunals given its significance in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
in the preamble of major international covenants. See Heinz Klug, The Dignity Clause of 
the Montana Constitution: May Foreign Jurisprudence Lead the Way to an Expanded 
Interpretation?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 133 (2003). 
11. See DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 299·301, 323-27 (2d ed. 1997); Fletcher, supra note 4, at 178-82 
(emphasizing that under German basic law, it is the duty of the state to recognize and 
keep inviolable human dignity); see also EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE U.S. (Praeger 2002); Klug, supra note 10. 
12. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) 
(holding that government generally does not have constitutional obligation under Due 
Process clause to protect individuals from private violence), with Robin West, Rights, 
Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1911 (2001) (arguing that 
the Fourteenth Amendment should be understood to commit government to positive 
obligation of "equal protection"), and Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A 
Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990). 
13. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), for a recent set of exchanges. 
Compare id. at 316 n.21 (noting world community's disapproval of death penalty for 
mentally retarded offenders), with id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with court's reliance on world community views), and id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (also disagreeing). See also Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and 
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality," 
Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 585-86 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 
DUKE L.J. 223 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, Gender and Transnational Legal Discourse, 14 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377 (2002). 
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of in the United States,14 transnational discourse involving 
national courts, supranational and international tribunals is 
still subject to an internal debate in the United States about its 
relevance and propriety. 15 
However, international and national courts are not the only 
locations for the diffusion and generation of post World War II 
constitutional norms; concomitantly, federal law is not the only 
law whose interpretation might be informed by comparative 
developments. In the United States, each state has its own 
constitution, which is the source and site for normative 
constitutional development. Moreover, state common law and 
statutory law are also within the interpretive province of the 
state courts. Given the plethora of jurisdictions with often 
comparable provisions, many state courts have experience with 
the benefits of comparative law by looking to the interpretations 
of other state courts, albeit within the bounds of the "nested" 
federalism of the United States, in which all states are 
constrained by the supremacy of federal law. 16 Thus, 
notwithstanding scholarly debate over the possibilities for "bona 
fide" state constitutionalism or for trans-state constitutionalism 
in the United States,17 many states have experience with trans-
14. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2481, 2483; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 n.8, 718 n.16 (1997); Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). 
15. Compare, Atkins, 536 U.s. at 316 n.21, and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
975-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), and Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.l1. 
16. See Vicki C. Jackson, Citizenship and Federalism, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 127 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 
Carnegie 2001); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 
VA. J. INT'L L. 237, 270 (1994). 
17. There are a number of different perspectives on whether the United States should 
be understood to offer serious opportunities for the development of state-level 
constitutionalism based on comparative state constitutional discourse. See, e.g., James 
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 831-32 
(1992) (seeking to explain "failure of state constitutionalism" in part because significant 
state constitutionalism is incompatible with national constitutionalism and suggesting 
that variations among state constitutions are "clumpy, irregular variations of a single 
national character" arising from bargaining, rather than commitments of principle and 
deliberation); Hans Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. 
L. REV. 165, 195-96 (1984) (arguing that differences among state constitutions are 
meaningful, because those constitutional texts are "unmistakable evidence of societal 
action" and are "important not for what a court must decide but for what it cannot 
plausibly decide"); James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 
24 RUTGERS L.J. 985 (1993) (arguing that Gardner is right only in part and that there 
are some aspects of state constitutions that are results of popular deliberation and 
struggles over high principle, including direct democracy and free public education); Paul 
Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 
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state comparative law18 and, in some cases, with comparative 
state constitutional interpretation.l9 This exper-ience is helpful, 
because we are entering a world in which sustaining the 
autonomy of one legal system from another becomes more 
difficult as decision makers come to know more and as members 
of different legal orders increasingly interact with each other.20 
Montana's constitutional history illustrates both the 
possibilities and the limitations of such multilayered trans-
boundary constitutional influences. European concepts of 
"human dignity" have evolved in directions quite different from 
those in much of the United States, for reasons related at least 
in part to the interactions among newer and older legal ideas 
and the varying capacities of existing legal systems to assimilate 
newer legal norms to existing traditions. 
(1993) (arguing that state courts should be seen as different interpreters of 
constitutionalism at the intersection of state and federal authorities and that state 
constitutional debate cannot close its eyes to the larger discursive community in which it 
finds itself; also arguing against originalism in state constitutional interpretation 
because state residents do not see themselves as members of a state community reaching 
back to a founding and arguing for engaging in interpretation within the larger 
interpretive community of the nation); Daniel Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory 
and its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271 (1998) (calling for a trans· state constitutional 
theory, because states are not political islands, but units of government within a diffuse 
union of states facing similar problems). 
18. See, e.g., Albinger v. Harris, 2002 MT 118, '11'11 24-28, 310 Mont. 27, '11'11 24-28, 48 P. 
3d 711, '11'11 24-28 (2002) (reviewing other state court precedents to help determine 
appropriate rule for resolving disputes about ownership of engagement rings); Bruce v. 
Dyer, 524 A.2d 777, 783-86 (Md. 1987) (describing in detail the "split of authority" from 
other state court jurisdictions on whether "agreement to sell realty held in tenancy by 
the entireties and to divide the proceeds causes an immediate conversion of the estate 
into a tenancy in common"); Miller v. State, 732 P.2d 1054, 1063-64 (Wyo. 1987) 
(discussing decisions of other states' courts on intent to defraud element required for 
criminal conviction under Wyoming case law). 
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498-99 (Ky. 1992) (holding 
state sodomy statute unconstitutional under state guarantees of privacy, found to be 
broader than those of U.S. Constitution, and citing in support other state court 
constitutional decisions from New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Texas); see also 
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) (setting forth the "general 
rule" that, in briefing questions of Pennsylvania state constitutional law, the parties 
should analyze four factors, including "related case-law from other states"). 
20. Cf Hans Linde, Book Review: Materials on International Human Rights and U.S. 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1991) (noting that U.S. states may 
not think to look to foreign or international sources of law on criminal procedure issues 
out of belief that U.S. system is necessarily superior, but implicitly suggesting that 
states might learn from comparison with international and comparative materials); 
Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 13, at 600-01 (noting inevitability of 
comparison and benefit of increased knowledge on which to ground more accurate 
comparisons). 
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I. THE MONTANA HUMAN DIGNITY CLAUSE: ITS INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE ROOTS 
Article II, section 4 of the Montana Constitution provides: 
Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. 
Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation or institution 
shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or 
political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin 
or condition, or political or religious ideas. 
Montana is unique among the fifty U.S. states to so explicitly 
and generally protect human dignity in its constitutional 
document. 21 How that clause comes to be in the Montana 
Constitution is a story involving both a deliberate process of 
comparative study and the impact of a mother's commitment to 
equality and human dignity on a son who was a member of the 
Montana Constitutional Convention in 1971. 
In 1971, the people of Montana voted to hold a 
constitutional convention to propose a replacement for the 1889 
Constitution. At least one impetus for the convention was the 
failure of the 1889 Constitution to include sufficient protections 
from discrimination.22 The legislature established a Con-
21. Only two other state constitutions of which I am aware explicitly refer to human 
or individual dignity. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, apparently inspired in part by 
article II, section 4 of the Montana Constitution of 1972, includes section 3, "Right to 
Individual Dignity." See Mary Anne Wolf, Louisiana's Equal Protection Guarantee: 
Questions About the Supreme Court Decision Prohibiting Affirmative Action, 58 LA. L. 
REV. 1209, 1223 (1998). The text of the provision, however, does not repeat the words 
used in its title. It provides in full: 
§3 Right to Individual Dignity. 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall 
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs or 
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably discriminate 
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition or 
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, 
except in the latter case as punishment for crime. 
LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. In Illinois, article I, section 20 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, 
titled simply "Individual Dignity," protects "individual dignity" by "condemning" 
communications that incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility towards persons or 
groups based on religion, race, or ethnic or national affiliation. The provision has been 
construed as "purely hortatory," and creating no private cause of action nor imposing a 
limitation on the powers of government. AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 772 N.E.2d 
953,957,961 (Ill. 2002); Irving v. J. L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983,984 (Ill. 1977). 
22. See Tia Rikel Robbin, Untouched Protection from Discrimination: Private Action 
in Montana's Individual Dignity Clause, 51 MONT. L. REV. 553,555 (1990). 
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stitutional Convention Commission which, inter alia, prepared 
several studies, including one that contained selected provisions 
from the bill of rights provisions of other jurisdictions. The 
delegates, elected in late 1971, deliberated and drafted the 
proposed constitution in the early part of 1972; the proposed 
constitution was accepted by the voters in June, 1972.23 
In the work of the Commission, a deliberate effort was made 
to benefit from comparative learning. Constitutional Convention 
Study Number 10, on the Bill of Rights, is over 300 pages of text 
analyzing federal and state caselaw and scholarly works on 
constitutions and constitutionalism in the United States.24 Its 
forty-page appendix of "Selected Rights Provisions" includes 
provisions from many state constitutions, designed to suggest 
"alternative subjects and wording that might be considered for 
inclusion" in the new Montana Constitution. Included under the 
general heading of "Freedom from Discrimination," is article II, 
section 1 of the Puerto Rico Constitution, which begins with: 
"The dignity of the human being is inviolable"-language 
ultimately borrowed and included in the Montana Constitution. 
According to two studies of the dignity clause in the 
Montana Constitution, the language for this clause was indeed 
drawn from the Puerto Rican constitution's provisions included 
in this study.25 As Clifford and Huff report, Richard Champoux, 
the delegate who introduced into the Montana Convention the 
proposed text that became article II, section 4, not only 
confirmed the Puerto Rican source but explained his own 
purposes in introducing the language: 
When asked about his intentions . . . he spoke eloquently about 
the influence of his mother, who strongly believed that men and 
women should be treated equally and with dignity . . . . [H]is 
mother's beliefs reflected, in part, the indignities she had suffered 
in the employment markets when she was unable to get a job .... 
[He also expressed] deep concern about the degradation of native 
peoples in Montana .... 26 
23. See Mathew O. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and 
Scope of the Montana Constitution's Dignity Clause With Possible Applications, 61 MONT. 
L. REV. 301, 315 (2000) (citing Rick Applegate, Study No. 10: Bill of Rights, in 
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971·1972, at iii (prepared by Mont. Const'l 
Convention Comm'n); 1 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS vi 
(1982». 
24. See Rick Applegate, Study No. 10: Bill of Rights, in MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 1971·1972 (prepared by Mont. Const'l Convention Comm'n). 
25. Clifford & Huff, supra note 23, at 321 n.92 (2000); see also Robbin, supra note 22, 
at 555·56. 
26. Clifford & Huff, supra note 23, at 321 n.92. I am grateful to the authors of this 
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If Montana was inspired by Puerto Rico in 1972, how did 
Puerto Rico come to have a dignity clause in its constitution? 
Adopted in 1951, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, in article II, section 1, declares: 
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. All men are equal 
before the law. No discrimination shall be made on account of 
race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or 
religious ideas. Both the laws and the system of public education 
shall embody these principles of essential human equality. 
This inviolable dignity clause is characterized both by 
constitutional scholars and by Puerto Rican courts as 
fundamental to the entire structure of the Puerto Rican 
constitution (in ways reminiscent of the German constitutional 
Court's treatment of human dignity as a basic norm). As one 
constitutional scholar explained, the concept of the dignity of the 
human being is "the moral basis for democratic government," 
and implies the "essential equality" of all people before the 
law.27 In other words, the inviolable dignity of human beings 
must be reflected in both the governance structures of a 
democracy and the way in which individual members are 
treated. 
The movement in the late 1940s for constitutional change in 
Puerto Rico was the result of a complex interaction between 
different political views and aspirations for Puerto Rico's status 
and relationship to the United States, both in Puerto Rico and in 
the Congress. 28 These developments were influenced by what 
study for having called delegate Champoux and interviewed him concerning this history 
and for having included this information in their helpful article. Robbin agrees that 
Champoux is the delegate who introduced the proposal ultimately adopted as article II, 
section 4 of the Montana Constitution. See Robbin, supra note 22, at 560 n.43. 
27. JUAN M. GARCIA-PASSALACQUA, PUERTO RICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 41 (1974). 
Note that Puerto Rico's constitution also has a provision that every person has the right 
to protection of law against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or 
family life. See P.R. CONST. art II, § 8 ("Every person has the right to the protection of 
law against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life."). 
28. See JUAL'I! TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (U. P.R. Press 1985). In 1950, Congress authorized Puerto Rico 
to adopt, by referendum, a constitution, subject to certain federal limitations. See id. at 
146-53. Delegates to a constitutional convention in Puerto Rico were elected and their 
draft approved by referendum in 1951-52. See id. at 153. Under the 1950 federal law, 
Congress had reserved authority to approve the constitution before it went into effect, 
and Congress ultimately insisted on the removal of a section guaranteeing positive social 
welfare rights and the revision of another dealing with the right to a free public 
education, before approving the constitution. [d. at 154-58. Whether the course of 
dealings leading to the adoption of the constitution was in the nature of a compact, 
changeable only by mutual consent of both parties, or had changed nothing about Puerto 
Rico's status insofar as it was subject to legislative control by Congress was a subject of 
serious disagreement. See infra note 30. 
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one author has called an "international atmosphere of de-
colonization" and the ideas of "self-government and inde-
pendence that developed during the international 'independence 
boom' at the end of the Second World War."29 
In drafting the Commonwealth Constitution the drafters 
both used and expanded on the U.S. Constitution, drawing on 
international human rights norms. The United Nations played a 
key role, both in inspiring provisions based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and as a vehicle for attempted 
resolution of the Commonwealth's relationship to the United 
States. 30 As one study says, ''borrowing from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights" approved by the United 
Nations,31 the Puerto Rican constitution included rights not then 
found in the federal, or in other state, constitutions. 32 According 
to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico: 
[F]ormulation of a Bill of Rights following a broader style than the 
traditional, that would gather the common feeling of different 
cultures on new categories of rights[,] was sought. Hence the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American 
Declaration of Human Rights and Duties exercised such an 
important influence in the drafting of our Bill of Rights. 33 
The Puerto Rican courts have emphasized statements by 
drafters to the effect that the right to human dignity was the 
29. ALFREDO MONTALVo·BARBOT, POLITICAL CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
IN PUERTO RICO, 1898·1952, at 118 (D. Press of Am. 1997); see also id. at 125 (noting 
assertion by governor of Puerto Rico's "unique political and economic structure"). 
30. See TORRUELLA, supra note 28, at 160·65 (describing representations made to the 
U.N. committee overseeing colonial possessions that, by 1953, the United State's 
relationship with Puerto Rico was that of a compact, changeable by neither body 
unilaterally, and thus Puerto Rico was outside any reporting obligations respecting 
colonies). However, both in the 1950s and since, other statements from members of the 
government of the United States have been that Puerto Rico remains subject to the 
powers of Congress, exercisable without Puerto Rico's consent. See, e.g., id. at 169·75 
(describing congressional views in the 1950s); H.R. REP. NO. 104·713, pt. 1, at 10, 21·22 
(1996) (asserting that existing authority for self governance in Puerto Rico could be 
"rescinded" by Congress pursuant to Territories clause and referring to opinion from 
Justice Department that "mutual consent" clauses were ineffective as not binding later 
Congresses); see also id. at 14 (referring to "discrepancy" between interpretation of 
Puerto Rico status by U.N. in 1953 and "reality" of Puerto Rico's status in United States 
federal system). 
31. MONTALVO·BARBOT, supra note 29, at 135·36 (noting in particular the right to 
work, health, clothing and medical care). 
32. As noted above, provisions guaranteeing certain social welfare rights in the 
Puerto Rico constitution were controversial in Congress and were deleted or modified 
before approval of the Commonwealth Constitution. See id. at 136·41; TORRUELLA, 
supra note 28, at 154·58. 
33. Arroyo v. Rattan Specialties, Inc., 117 P.R. Dec. 35, 60 (1986) (quoting Estado 
Libre Asociado v. Hermandad de Empleados, 104 P.R. Dec. 436, 439·40 (1975». 
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foundational and most important element of that Bill of Rights, 
one from which all others could be inferred even if they had not 
been express.34 The influences on the Bill of Rights of the 
Puerto Rican constitution, then, were themselves transnational 
and international in character, and their influence was the 
product of a deliberate effort to "gather... [from] different 
cultures ... new categories of rights." 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 
1948, just three years before the Puerto Rican constitution, 
begins with a whereas clause referring to the "inherent dignity" 
of human beings, and its first article states: "All human beings 
are born free and equal in rights and dignity."35 The American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, also adopted in 
1948, likewise acknowledges in its first line the "dignity of the 
individual," and in the first line of its preamble states: "All men 
are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights."36 
Puerto Rico's incorporation of language and ideas from 
these international human rights documents was part of a wave 
of post World War II constitution making. Puerto Rico's 1951 
Constitution parallels the German Basic Law of 1949 in two 
interesting respects (though I am unaware of any direct 
influence of the German constitution on Puerto Rico's 
constitution). The German Basic Law, adopted in 1949 under 
Allied supervision, begins with article I, section 1: "The dignity 
of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty 
of all public authority." According to Donald Kommers, a 
leading U.S. scholar of the German constitution: 
[The human dignity clause is] of primary importance .... In the 
view of the Federal Constitutional Court, this clause expresses the 
highest value of the Basic Law, informing the substance and spirit 
of the entire document. While encompassing all guaranteed 
rights, the concept of human dignity also includes a morality of 
34. See, e.g., Arroyo, 117 P.R. Dec. at 69·72 (discussing statements made by the 
Convention on the Bill of Rights regarding the purpose of the dignity clause found in 4 
DIARIO DE SESIONES DE LA CONVENCION CONSTlTUTYENTE 2561, and 2 DIARIO DE 
SESIONES DE LA CONVENCION CONSTITUYENTE 1372); Figueroa Ferrer v. 
Commonwealth, 107 P.R. Dec. 278, 281-87 (1978) (discussing the meaning of the dignity 
clause as a constitutional right and its relationship to the right of privacy established in 
article II, section 8 of the Puerto Rican constitution). 
35. See GLENDON, supra note 3, at 174 (describing views of a principal drafter, Rene 
Cassin, that the general principles of "dignity, liberty, equality and brotherhood" were 
the foundations for the rest of the Declaration); cf. id_ at 146 (describing Eleanor 
Roosevelt's defense of the dignity clause in the Universal Declaration as meant to 
explain why human beings have rights to begin with). 
36. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 4. 
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duty that may limit the exercise of a fundamental right.37 
Like Puerto Rico's constitution, the German Basic Law prohibits 
the death penalty, a provision not found in either of the 
international instruments discussed above.3s Whatever specific 
transnational influences may have been at work, both Puerto 
Rico and Germany were part of a wider constitution-making 
phenomenon reflecting increased legal commitments to human 
rights. 
So, to summarize: Montana's "human dignity" clause reveals 
connections to a history of international and foreign 
constitution-making and human rights declarations in the years 
following the end of World War II, at a time when the 
international community was converging on the centrality of 
human dignity as a fundamental value.39 Puerto Rico, in its own 
struggle for greater degrees of autonomy and independence, 
deliberately seeks to incorporate multiple constitutional tra-
ditions and borrows language and ideas for its human dignity 
clause from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other transnational sources. Given the importance of 
international supervision to emerging colonies, it was perhaps 
especially understandable that Puerto Rico should have looked 
in this direction for influence. But what is perhaps less 
predictable is that twenty years later, the state of Montana 
would in turn look to Puerto Rico, not necessarily in a self-
conscious effort to draw on different constitutional cultures but 
simply to improve its own constitution. From the defeat of the 
Nazis, to international declarations of the centrality of human 
dignity, to a constitutionally anomalous territory becoming a 
commonwealth of the United States, to the State of Montana, 
37. KOMMERS, supra note 11, at 298. For an insightful discussion of the pre· World 
War II roots of German and French commitments to the protection of personal dignity, 
rooted in respect for honor, see James Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three 
Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000). 
38. See P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7 (stating that the "death penalty shall not exist); 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG) art. 102 (F.R.G.) (German Basic Law provision that "capital 
punishment is abolished"). The German Basic Law also includes the idea of state 
responsibility for social welfare, an idea embodied as well in the version of a proposed 
constitution drafted by the Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention and approved in a 
popular referendum. As noted above, some of the social welfare provisions in the Puerto 
Rican constitution were stricken by Congress before it would approve the proposed 
constitution in 1951. See supra note 28. 
39. In the Japanese constitution, the word dignity appears in article 24, dealing with 
equality of the sexes with respect to matrimonial and family matters. See KENPO, art. 
24. This constitution was drafted, essentially by the Allied Command, in 1946-two 
years before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. 
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the idea of a constitutional right to human dignity has traveled 
through a set of international and intra-national boundaries. 
II. HUMAN DIGNITY AS TRANSPLANT: DOMESTICATION OR 
INVIGORATION? 
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the idea of 
human dignity was a unifying basic concept that related both to 
the guarantees of "negative" civil rights and liberties40 and 
"positive" concepts of human rights to minimally adequate 
necessities of life.41 The dignity clause in the Montana 
Constitution, coupled with the extension of the ban on 
discrimination to private persons as well as the government, 
might have foreshadowed judicial development of a juris-
prudence closer to those of nations, like Germany, under the 
influence of domestic constitutional social welfare commitments. 
But for the most part, the dignity clause in Montana has been 
treated as reinforcing values, such as protection from unlawful 
searches and seizures, government discrimination, and privacy, 
more specifically identified elsewhere. The migration of the idea 
of human dignity illustrates not only the diffusion of ideas but 
also the interaction between new ideas and other elements of 
the system in which they are embraced. The impact of 
constitutional text may vary substantially depending on context, 
development, history and culture. New texts may be as readily 
domesticated within existing paradigms as they may transform 
those paradigms.42 A brief discussion of human dignity and 
constitutional law in Montana and Puerto Rico will illustrate 
40. See, e.g., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 3, arts. 9-11 (protection from 
arbitrary arrest or punishment without trial in which presumption of innocence obtains). 
41. See, e.g., id. arts. 22-26 (right to social security, right to work in just conditions, 
right to education). 
42. Professor Klug has suggested that Montana "mine foreign dignity jurisprudence 
in its efforts to define the content and scope of its own clause," despite "inherent 
limitations" based on "particular legal forms inherent to [other) countries' legal systems." 
Klug, supra note 10, at 155. Although I share Professor Klug's enthusiasm for 
increasing judicial awareness of constitutional development in other countries of cognate 
legal ideas and values, the term "mining" connotes a more direct kind of utilization of 
external sources of law. Even where the same words are used to refer to concepts or 
rights with universal qualities, both institutional and historic differences may mediate 
and complicate the directness of appropriate influence or consideration. See Neuman, 
supra note 9, at 1890. 
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this phenomenon. 
Notwithstanding the presence of the human dignity clause 
in the Montana Constitution for now over thirty years, it has 
played a secondary and at best complementary role in the 
Montana cases in which it has appeared.43 Far more important 
has been the next sentence of article II, section 4, securing equal 
protection. It is not uncommon to find courts employing 
extended analysis of the equal protection component of the 
constitutional provision,44 with perhaps a short rhetorical 
reference to dignity. Notwithstanding the constitutional text 
extending the anti-discrimination principle to action by private 
entities, there are a number of Montana cases that appear to say 
that the equal protection clause has the same meaning as the 
federal equal protection provision (which applies only in the 
presence of state action).45 The analogy to the federal 
43. For discussion of this underutilization, see, for example, Robbin, supra note 22, at 
553·54, 562·63, Clifford & Huff, supra note 23, at 302·303, and Mark S. Kende, The 
Issues of E-Mail Privacy and Cyberspace Personal Jurisdiction: What Clients Need to 
Know About Two Practical Constitutional Questions Regarding the Internet, 63 MONT. L. 
REV. 301, 315-16 (2002). 
44. For cases decided under Montana's "individual dignity" clause that focus analysis 
on equal protection, see, for example, State v. Taylor, 168 Mont. 142, 542 P.2d 100 
(1975), which rejected an equal protection challenge to a method of jury selection, Oberg 
v. City of Billings, 207 Mont. 277, 674 P.2d 494 (1983), finding unconstitutional an 
exception as to law enforcement workers from a state statute that generally barred 
employers' use of polygraphs, Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 744 P.2d 
895 (1987), holding unconstitutional a workers' compensation statute's exclusion of 
members of the employer's family, and Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co., 259 Mont. 147, 855 
P.2d 506 (1993), rejecting a challenge to an exclusion for recovery for mental stress in 
workers' compensation law. 
45. See Emery v. State, 177 Mont. 73, 79, 580 P.2d 445, 449 (1978) (stating that "[t]he 
similar provisions of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and 
the equal protection clause of the 1972 Montana Constitution provide generally 
equivalent but independent protection in their respective jurisdictions"); see also Godfrey 
v. State Fish & Game Comm'n, 193 Mont. 304, 306, 631 P.2d 1265, 1267 (1981) (noting 
that both the Montana Constitution, article II, section 4, and the equal protection clause 
of the U.S. Constitution have the same purpose, to "ensure that persons who are citizens 
of this country are not the subject of arbitrary and discriminate [sic] state action"). As 
noted, the analogy is particularly surprising in light of the apparently clear text of the 
equal protection part of the Montana clause to extend to private discrimination, when 
the federal equal protection clause does not. See Robbin, supra note 22, at 553, 556 
(describing different understandings of this clause in the Convention, noting that its 
prohibition of discrimination by private parties "has remained dormant," and urging 
more use of its express language to protect people from private as well as public 
discrimination). But, for more recent apparent judicial recognition that the clause does 
apply to private discrimination, see Harrison v. Chance, 244 Mont. 215, 225, 797 P.2d 
200, 206 (1990), asserting, in a sexual harassment claim against a private employer, that 
"[f1reedom from sexual discrimination is a constitutional right in Montana under Article 
II, Section 4," but concluding that the plaintiffs exclusive remedy was that provided in 
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Constitution may have overwhelmed the potential for developing 
independent lines of analysis that are latent in the individual 
dignity clause.46 
Yet, justices on the Montana Supreme Court have also 
asserted on occasion that the state constitution provides rights 
that are different from and, in some respects, more expansive 
than those in the federal Constitution;47 in some cases, the 
dignity clause may have played some role. 
In Oberg u. City of Billings,48 a police officer challenged a 
requirement that he submit to a polygraph, and argued that an 
exemption in a state law generally prohibiting employer's uses 
of polygraphs for law enforcement employees was uncon-
stitutional. The court agreed, finding the exception uncon-
state statute, and Drinkwalter v. Shipton Supply Co., 225 Mont. 380, 732 P.2d 1335 
(1987), holding that the legislature had not indicated a clear intent to abolish other 
common law remedies and that, in light of the constitution's protection against gender 
discrimination, plaintiff was not limited to a statutory Human Rights Commission 
remedy for sexual harassment. Drinkwalter, as was noted in Harrison, was legislatively 
overruled within months of being decided; Harrison upheld the limitation of such 
plaintiffs to the statutory Human Rights Commission remedy. In a very recent dissent, 
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray has argued that discussion by the delegates to Montana's 
Constitutional Convention shows that the "dignity" clause of article II, section 4 
captured an intent to "eradicat[e] public and private discrimination based on race, color, 
sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas," and that the section 
had "no intent" to accomplish anything other than removal of certain types of 
discrimination. Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ~~ 98-99, 316 Mont. 103, ~~ 98-99, 68 
P.2d 872, ~~ 98-99 (Gray, C.J., dissenting) (quoting two different delegates). She 
concluded that "[n]othing in the transcripts supports a free-standing, separate dignity 
right." Id. ~ 99. Chief Justice Gray's emphasis in her opinion was on the absence of a 
separate right to human dignity, and not on whether the section extended to private 
discrimination, though the passage quoted above contemplates that it does reach such 
private discrimination. 
46. See also Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana 
Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095 (1985) (describing Montana Supreme Court's failure to 
adhere to state grounds of decision with respect to unlawful search and seizure on 
Supreme Court remand of issue). 
47. See, e.g., Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, 312 Mont. 1, 58 P.2d 128 (holding 
that cause of action for monetary relief is implied from provision of state constitution 
protecting privacy, relying on state constitution and statutory law and considering cases 
from many other states). Justice Nelson, concurring, emphasized that: 
{IJndependent of any federal jurisprudence, federal constitutional authority, 
the common law, or other authority, the foundation for private causes of action 
for damages for constitutional violations is found in the language of Montana's 
1972 Constitution ... it is important to acknowledge this principle, because the 
greater guarantees of individual rights afforded by Montana's Constitution 
may be neither bounded nor frustrated by federal court decisions which, with 
seeming increasing frequency, are weakening similar protections of the federal 
Constitution. 
Id. ~ 84. 
48. 207 Mont. 277, 674 P.2d 494 (1983). 
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stitutional under "rational basis" equal protection scrutiny.49 In 
dicta, the court indicated, that had there been further evidence 
that the exception was intended by the legislature to apply to 
law enforcement officers because of their office of public trust, 
the exception would have passed rational basis scrutiny, but 
would still have been vulnerable under strict scrutiny because, 
under article II, section 4, "subjecting one to a lie detector test is 
an affront to one's dignity."50 
In Gryczan v. State, 51 the court held unconstitutional a 
statute criminalizing gay sex between adults. The court rested 
on violations of the right to privacy, without resolving challenges 
that the statute infringed the right to dignity and the right to 
equal protection of the law. 52 And in Armstrong v. State, 53 the 
court noted the dignity clause as well as the state constitution's 
privacy clause in support of its conclusion that a statute 
prohibiting certified physician assistants from performing 
abortions violated the right to privacy protected by article II, 
section 10 of the Montana Constitution. 
In an interesting discussion, Armstrong appears to attribute 
both some independent value to the "dignity" clause and a 
coherent connectedness between the right to dignity and other 
rights secured in the state constitution: 
Respect for the dignity of each individual-a fundamental right, 
protected by Article II Section 4 of the Montana Constitution-
demands that people have for themselves the moral right and 
moral responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions 
about the meaning and value of their own lives and the intrinsic 
value of life in general, answering to their own consciences and 
convictions. Equal protection. .. requires that people have an 
equal right to form and to follow their own values in profoundly 
spiritual matters .... Finally the right of individual privacy ... 
requires the government to leave us alone in all these most 
personal and private matters.54 
Armstrong raised the possibility that the Montana court was 
poised to articulate a distinctive vision of what respect for 
individual human dignity means by building on this passage. 55 
49. See Oberg, 207 Mont. at 281, 674 P.2d at 496. 
50. Oberg, 207 Mont. at 285, 674 P.2d at 498. 
51. 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997). 
52. See Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 451, 942 P.2d at 123. 
53. 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364. 
54. Id. ~ 72. 
55. For possible evidence of this, see Associated Press, Inc. v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 
2000 MT 160, ~ 58, 300 Mont. 233, ~ 58, 4 P.3d 5, ~ 58, in which Justice Nelson, 
specially concurring, relied on the individual dignity clause to conclude that the right to 
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Yet in Armstrong, the court's emphasis on the dignity clause as 
respecting people's rights to make their own decisions about 
fundamental questions appears virtually identical to the right of 
personal decision making, articulated as a matter of federal 
constitutional law in Casey, notwithstanding the absence of a 
human dignity clause in the U.S. Constitution.56 
Although this might suggest that the human dignity clause 
should be understood simply as a new phrase permitting 
elaboration of analyses already reasonably well developed under 
other clauses in U.S. constitutional culture, two later cases 
suggest that a more expansive use of the human dignity clause 
in ~ontana may have arrived. In Albinger u. Harris,57 the court 
held, in an issue of first impression in Montana, that an 
engagement ring was an irrevocable gift, rejecting the view of 
many other states that it was conditional on marriage. In the 
opinion for the court, Justice Nelson (who has also sought to give 
substance to the "dignity" idea in his opinions in Gryczan and 
Associated Press) relied on the individual dignity clause as 
committing the state to oppose gender bias. The court 
concluded that, in the context of the abolition of actions for 
breach of a promise to marry (including denial of actions to 
recover money spent-in the court's view, typically by women-
on wedding preparations), treating engagement rings as 
conditional gifts would reinforce gender unfairness. The court 
wrote: 
Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution recognizes and 
guarantees the individual dignity of each human being without 
regard to gender .... While not explicitly denying access to the 
courts on the basis of gender, the 'anti-heart balm' statutes closed 
courtrooms across the nation to female plaintiffs seeking damages 
for antenuptial pregnancy, ruined reputation, lost love and 
economic insecurity .... Conditional gift theory applied ex-
clusively to engagement ring cases carves an exception in the 
state's gift law for the benefit of predominantly male plaintiffs .... 
[T]he statutory 'anti-heart balm' bar continues to have a disparate 
impact on women. If this Court were to fashion a special exception 
for engagement ring actions under gift law theories, we would 
privacy protected by the Montana Constitution is that of individuals, not corporations. 
56. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (Joint Opinion of 
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter) ("These matters, involving the most intimate 
and personal choices Ii person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."). 
57. 2002 MT 118, 310 Mont. 27, 48 P.3d 711. 
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perpetuate the gender bias attendant upon the Legislature's 
decision to remove from our courts all actions for breach of 
antenuptial promises.58 
Although the court relied specifically on the individual dignity 
clause, given its reasoning it might well also have relied on the 
commitment to equality and antidiscrimination found in the 
same section. 
Most recently in Walker v. State, 59 the Montana Supreme 
Court, again in an opinion by Justice Nelson, concluded that the 
Montana Constitution's human dignity provision established 
more demanding standards for the treatment of prisoners than 
those under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Although Montana's constitution has a cruel and unusual 
punishment clause, the court indicated that in some cases that 
clause must be interpreted together with the individual dignity 
clause to require that, '''whatever means we use to reform, we 
must not punish or reform in a way that degrades the humanity, 
the dignity of the prisoner."'6o The court is explicit in stating 
that the human dignity clause, together with article II, section 
22 of the Montana Constitution "provide Montana citizens 
greater protections from cruel and unusual punishment than 
does the federal Constitution."61 Although the language of 
article II, section 22 of the Montana Constitution tracks that of 
the federal clause,62 the court indicated that in some cases, the 
right of individual dignity will be implicated together with the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause and found such a violation 
there.63 A strongly worded dissent disagreed with the effort to 
ground a heightened standard for the treatment of prisoners in 
58. Id. 'If'lf 35-37. The court's opinion elicited a strongly worded dissent by Justice 
Trieweiler. See id. 'If 75 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting) (noting that the dignity clause and 
gender bias arguments had not been raised by the partie~ and arguing that the court's 
opinion itself was based on gender stereotypes about who tends to jilt whom and who 
gives whom engagement rings and perpetuated gender bias). But see Rebecca Tushnet, 
Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE L.J. 2583 (1998) (arguing that "the shift to mandatory 
ring return rules and the denial of women's claims for restitution have combined to make 
premarital law unfavorable to women," a regime that is "both unequal and unjustified"). 
59. 2003 MT 134, 316 Mont. 103,68 P.3d 872. 
60. Id. 'If 81 (quoting Clifford & Huff, supra note 23, at 331·32). 
61. Id. 'If 73. 
62. Compare MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22 ("Excessive sanctions" clause, providing: 
"Excessive bail shall not be required, or excessive fines imposed, or cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted."), with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). 
63. The court found a violation where degrading living conditions (including very 
unhygienic conditions) exacerbated a prisoner's mental illness. Walker, 'If'lf 82-84. 
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the dignity clause, asserting that the only purpose of the 
constitutional section in which the dignity clause is found was to 
establish an antidiscrimination principle.64 
In contrast to the generally subordinate or, in recent years, 
controversial use of the human dignity clause in Montana, in a 
number of cases the Puerto Rican Supreme Court framed its 
analyses around the concept of human dignity, asserting that 
the inviolability of human dignity is the foundational concept at 
the base of the Commonwealth's commitments both to 
democracy and to human rights.65 Thus, in one case, the court 
quotes from the proceedings of the constitutional convention 
where the president of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, 
Jaime Benitez, explained the function of the human dignity 
clause: 
It is the affirmation of the moral principle of democracy; the 
principle that the human being and his dignity constitute the 
raison d'etre and justification of political organization .... [W]e 
believe that the expression, in its sober declaration, encompasses 
the totality of the principles that shall later on develop and delimit 
themselves as required in each case.66 
In developing its human dignity clause jurisprudence, the 
Puerto Rico court borrows from U.S. constitutional law on 
privacy (thus revealing similar convergences to those described 
in Montana),67 and also invokes scholarly work on human 
dignity,68 and the experience in other jurisdictions with similar 
64. Walker, ~~ 98-101 (Gray, C.J., dissenting). 
65. See Arroyo v. Rattan Specialities, Inc., 117 P.R. Dec. 35, 60, 69-70 (1986) (quoting 
from the record of the constitutional convention); Garcia Santiago v. Acosta, 104 P.R. 
Dec. 448, 453 (1975) (discussing degree to which state interference in family life is 
consistent with provision that dignity of human being is inviolable); Figueroa Ferrer v. 
Commonwealth, 107 P.R. Dec. 250, 278, 282-87 (1978) (holding that requirement for 
fault to obtain a divorce violated Puerto Rico's constitution, through discussion of dignity 
clause and privacy clause, and arguing that the inviolability of human dignity requires 
that interferences with private life be limited only to compelling circumstances). The 
cases often associate human dignity with the right of privacy and honor found later in 
the Puerto Rican constitution. For scholarly discussion, see Luis Anibal Aviles Pagan, 
Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality Rights in the Constitutional Jurisprudence of 
Germany, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 
343,366-70 (1998), describing the depth ofthe framers' commitments to the "principle of 
human dignity", and Garcia-Passalacqua, supra note 27, at 40-41, discussing human 
dignity as the moral basis for democratic government because the human being and his 
dignity constitute the reason for and justification of political organization. 
66. Arroyo, 117 P.R. Dec. at 70 (quoting 2 DIARIO DE SESIONES DE LA CONVENCI6N 
CONSTITUYENTE 1372 (1951». 
67. See Figueroa Ferrer, 107 P.R. Dec. at 284-86. 
68. See id. at 286 (referring, inter alia, to writings of Maaritan, Rommen, Friedman, 
Machan, McDougal, Lasswell, and Tribe). 
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issues,69 including in at least one instance a German 
constitutional court decision. 70 
The emphasis on human dignity comes through in a number 
of decisions under the Puerto Rico constitution. The 1978 
decision in Figueroa-Ferrer, holding that human dignity and 
privacy required no-fault divorce, found unconstitutional a 
divorce statute that permitted divorce only for cause; the court 
criticized a fault regime in divorce as one that requires married 
couples either to mislead the court or to surrender aspects of 
their private lives to public scrutiny.71 Moreover, the court 
noted the current reality was one in which couples in fact 
procured divorces on mutual consent, albeit through a judicial 
charade. The constitutional principles of dignity and privacy 
"are based on principles which aspire to universality," and 
"protect. .. dignity and private life in divorce proceedings 
through the expression of the mutual decision to obtain a 
divorce."72 
69. Id. at 287-95 (surveying divorce laws in many state jurisdictions in the United 
States and in the countries of Latin America and Europe). 
70. See Arroyo, 117 P.R. Dec. at 50 n.15 (citing a German case on polygraphy, 
Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (/. Strafsenat), Feb. 16, 1954, 5 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 332). 
71. Figueroa Ferrer, 107 P.R. Dec. at 301. In other parts of the United States it 
appears that the move to "no-fault" divorce was led by legislatures, and that the issues 
brought before courts challenged the constitutionality of abandonment of fault-based 
grounds for divorce. See, e.g., In re Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108 (1972); Joy v. Joy, 423 
A.2d 895 (Conn. 1979); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973). For at least a hint 
that some members of the U.S. Supreme Court would have regarded with skepticism a 
claim that the federal Constitution prohibited states from maintaining a fault-based 
system for divorce, see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 462 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Disagreeing with the Court's decision upholding fees for indigent filings in 
bankruptcy, Justice Marshall argued that given the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371 (1971), striking down filing fees for divorce as applied to indigents, the 
same logic should have invalidated the bankruptcy filing fee. The Court had sought to 
distinguish bankruptcy from divorce because the granting of divorces impinges on 
"associational interests." Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-45. Justice Marshall's dissent 
commented on this "suggestion": 
Are we to require that state divorce laws serve compelling state interests? For 
example, if a State chooses to allow divorces only when one party is shown to 
have committed adultery, must its refusal to allow them when the parties 
claim irreconcilable differences be justified by some compelling state interest? 
Id. at 462 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall went on to explain that his questions 
were intended, "only to suggest that the majority's focus on the relative importance in 
the constitutional scheme of divorce and bankruptcy is misplaced," because the 
important issue was "access to the courts," id.; yet his questions hint at the difficulty a 
federal constitutional challenge to divorce laws might have faced. 
72. Figueroa Ferrer, 107 P.R. Dec. at 301. Between 1969 and 1991, virtually all of the 
states and D.C. had by statute provided for some form of no-fault divorce. See Lynn D. 
Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 83-91 
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In 1986, the Puerto Rico court in Arroyo held uncon-
stitutional a private employer's use of a polygraph. Human 
dignity played a central role in the opinion, which emphasized 
the need to respond to technological advances while protecting 
the most precious thing in the lives of all human beings in a 
democratic society: dignity, integrity and privacy. Our 
Constitution is the safekeeper of these values. Therefore, we must 
refer to its provisions and set them up as the main protectors of 
these ethico·moral values which are consubstantial with human 
nature and essential to community life in a democratic society. 73 
The court went on to assert that the right to control the 
disclosure of one's own thoughts was protected by the 
constitution, as against intrusions by the state and private 
citizens.74 
This opinion has a distinctive feel to it, as compared to the 
Montana court's OpInIOn in Oberg (also dealing with 
polygraphy), both in the form and breadth of argument from a 
variety of comparative sources and in the Puerto Rico court's 
confident assertion that the constitution constrained private 
citizens in their dealings with others.75 Interestingly, the Puerto 
Rico court cites both to the German Basic Law provision that, 
"the dignity of the human being is inviolable," and to a German 
decision prohibiting use of polygraphs in a criminal case, not on 
grounds of their unreliability, but rather because use of 
polygraph tests, "violated the individual's freedom to make his 
own decisions and act according to his Will."76 While some U.S. 
state jurisdictions reached similar results as a matter of state 
tort law, constraining employers from using polygraphs on their 
employees,77 others did not;78 and both state and federal 
(1991) (all states but Arkansas); see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9·12·301(5) (2003). 
73. Arroyo, 117 P.R. Dec. at 56·57 (citations omitted). 
74. See id. at 72 ("Regardless of the degree of reliability that the polygraph test could 
reach, its intrusion upon the mind of the human being, with his thoughts, is such that he 
loses the freedom to control the disclosure of his own thoughts .... Our Constitution 
guarantees that a part of ourselves may be free from the intrusion of the State and of 
private citizens."). 
75. Although the Montana dignity clause's equal protection provision explicitly refers 
to private entities, this aspect of the clause for a long time lay "dormant," to use Robbin's 
word. Robbin, supra note 22, at 553; see supra note 45. 
76. Arroyo, 117 P.R. Dec. at 59 n.15 (citing Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (l. 
Strafsenat), Feb. 16, 1954, 5 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 
332). 
77. See, e.g., Cordle v. Gen. Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 CW. Va. 1984) 
(holding that it violated West Virginia's public policy to require an employee to be 
polygraph tested, because of the State's recognition of individual interests in privacy). 
78. See, e.g., Smith v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979) (upholding 
discharge of employee for refusing to take a polygraph test). 
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statutory schemes have been enacted which significantly limit 
employer-administered polygraphs. 79 The Puerto Rico court's 
reliance on its constitutional provisions to protect the right 
against self-disclosure has some resonance with a line of 
German cases protecting a right to control information about 
one's self derived from the human dignity clause.8o Also notable 
is its ready willingness to assert the application of the 
constitutional norm of human dignity to the actions of private 
parties, a step the Montana court has been criticized for failing 
to take in the face of seemingly explicit language.81 
Puerto Rican decisions in other areas as well invoke the 
human dignity and privacy clauses as a basis for distinctive 
constitutional interpretation. For example, the Puerto Rican 
court has asserted that the Puerto Rican constitutional provision 
against illegal searches and seizures, article II, section 10, 
should be more broadly construed to prevent searches than its 
counterpart in the U.S. Constitution, in part because of the 
foundational commitments to human dignity.82 A minor's right 
to determine his paternity was held to be protected by the 
79. In some cases, state courts were dealing with equal protection attacks on 
exclusions from statutory bars on polygraphs, and did not have to face what might seem 
more centrally related to the idea of human dignity-whether the use of the polygraph 
itself was unconstitutional. In addition to the Oberg decision in Montana, see, for 
example, Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660 (Cal. 
1986), upholding a constitutional challenge, based on equal protection, to the exception, 
for public employees from the general ban on the use of polygraph testing by employers. 
For the federal statute, see Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
2001·2009 (2000). 
80. See KOMMERS, supra note 11, at 299·301, 323·27. 
81. See supra notes 75, 45. Robbin, supra note 22, at 553, 556, draws attention as 
well to another area of contrasting decisions, the application of constitutional norms to 
private inheritance disputes. Compare In re Will of Cram, 186 Mont. 37, 606 P.2d 145 
(1980) (rejecting federal constitutional challenge to testamentary trust instructions 
excluding female 4-H members from receipt of benefits under provisions of will because 
of absence of "state action" and not referring at all to state constitutional provisions), 
with Gonzalez de Salas v. Super. Ct. of Puerto Rico, 97 P.R. Dec. 788, 791 (1969) 
(refusing to enforce custom denying female heirs the knowledge of a secret formula for 
the production of rum as inconsistent with the Puerto Rico constitution; "The family 
tradition may be kept among the heirs and interested parties, but they cannot have the 
benefit of the court to make good, against the laws and the Constitution [of the 
Commonwealth], a discrimination."). Neither of these cases refer to the respective 
human dignity clauses of their constitutions, but each decision illustrates something of 
the divergent approaches these courts have taken where the concerns of the human 
dignity clause might be thought in play. 
82. People v. Lebron, 108 P.R. Dec. 324, 340 (1979); People v. Gonzalez, 20 P.R. Offic. 
Trans. 487, 493 (1988); People v. Berrios, 142 P.R. Dec. 386, 397-98 (1997) (affirming 
that human dignity and privacy clauses give the Puerto Rican prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures more breadth than the federal one). 
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inviolable dignity clause,83 and the clause has been invoked in a 
variety of settings involving causes of action for wrongful 
discharge and tortious invasions of privacy and dignity-related 
interests.84 
The human dignity clause in Puerto Rico, then, has been 
drawn more actively into dialogue with other parts of the Puerto 
Rican constitution, perhaps not surprisingly, since the expressed 
motivation of the drafters was to bring together different 
constitutional cultures. Resonances with transnational human 
rights instruments and European constitutionalism (including 
that of Germany) are apparent not only in the constitution's 
textual provision on human dignity and prohibition of the death 
penalty, but in the question of compelled polygraphy, and 
perhaps others.85 In this sense, the "expressive" aspects of 
Puerto Rico's original decision to incorporate a more 
multicultural and transnational constitutionalism has been 
reflected in the subsequent constitutional decisions of the 
Commonwealth's highest court.86 
Although Montana's adoption of the human dignity clause 
was less explicitly associated with the purpose of bringing 
together different legal traditions than was the case in Puerto 
Rico, several very recent decisions in Montana (often written by 
Justice Nelson) suggest some greater degree of movement 
towards a more distinctive state constitutional jurisprudence. 
Very recently the Montana Supreme Court relied on the human 
dignity clause and principles of gender equality to inform its 
decision in an engagement ring return case between two private 
persons, and to find and enforce enhanced standards of 
treatment of prisoners. It has insisted, relying on the human 
dignity clause, on the independence in meaning of the Montana 
83. Lopez v. Santos, 109 P.R. Dec. 563, 754 (1980). The German constitutional Court 
has invoked the German "personality" clause, closely related to its "human dignity" 
clause, to strike down time limitations (two years after majority) on the ability of a child 
to contest his or her legitimacy. See KOMMERS, supra note 11, at 312·14 (discussing 
Child Legitimacy Case of 1994). 
84. See, e.g., Negron v. Caleb Brett U.S.A., Inc., 212 F.3d 666, 669·70 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(finding violation of rights of dignity and privacy under Puerto Rico constitution in 
wrongful discharge of employee for refusing to change lab results); Dopp v. Fairfax 
Consultants, Ltd., 771 F. Supp. 494, 496 (D.P.R. 1990) (noting breadth of Puerto Rico 
constitution's dignity clause in deciding, in diversity case, whether claim for invasion of 
privacy was dismissable). 
85. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
86. See generally Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1269·85 (1999) (discussing "expressive" functions of comparative 
constitutionalism). 
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Constitution from the federal Constitution.87 So if the human 
dignity clause in Montana has largely been confined to playing a 
supportive role in elaboration of long standing paradigms of 
individual rights, it may well be that a newer jurisprudence is 
now evolving in which the human dignity clause helps justify 
the construction of different paradigms. 
A further point to consider about the different sources of law 
that are subject to interpretation in the state courts is that the 
state courts generally have authority to elaborate on and change 
state common law, as well as to interpret the state constitution 
and statutes. For example, state courts sometimes look to state 
constitutional provisions-even those limited to government 
action-to determine the "public policy" to be applied in 
litigation between private litigants.88 The "engagement ring" 
decision might be taken as an example of this development in 
Montana. In New York, Chief Judge Judith Kaye has noted the 
ability of state courts to "move seamlessly between the common 
law and state constitutional law," and has also identified 
benefits from state court creativity based clearly on common law 
rather than constitutional grounds, because common law 
decisions are more readily subject to modification by courts and 
by legislatures.89 Such an attitude of invited partnership 
87. Cf Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, '11'11 79-114, 312 Mont. 1, '11'11 79-114, 58 
P.3d 128, '11'11 79-114 (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (noting that Montana Constitution 
should not be interpreted like federal because it includes many provisions, including 
dignity clause, that federal Constitution does not have, all in support of finding state 
constitutional privacy clause gives rise to implied private right of action for damages). 
88. Compare Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992) 
(concluding that private employer discharge of employee who failed random drug test 
was inconsistent with public policy and thus actionable as wrongful discharge and 
treating the state constitution as well as state common law and legislation as sources for 
public policy), with Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989) 
(concluding that although the state constitution's protection of privacy did not apply to 
private employers the provision could be considered by the court in determining whether 
public policy was offended by an employer's discharge of an employee but concluding that 
given public policy interests in safety the employer's drug testing did not contravene 
public policy) (I am grateful to ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 236 
(3d ed. 1999), for helpful attention to the phenomenon of state courts' use of state 
constitutions to determine public policy.). To the extent that state courts develop state 
common law based on the "policy" in state constitutional provisions, the distinctions in 
federal "state action" doctrine between the application of common law rules in private 
litigation, on the one hand, and application of state statutory or constitutional law, on 
the other, may become ever more difficult to sustain. 
89. Judith S. Kaye, Brennan Lecture: State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: 
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15-17 
(1995). Kaye's attitude of partnership with the legislature in the elaboration of rights is 
in marked contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court's assertion of hierarchic dominion over 
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between state courts and legislatures in defining rights stands 
in significant contrast to recent decisions on issues of federal law 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.90 It may reflect the state courts' 
deeper engagement with development of the common law, in 
which legislative intervention is now a norm. It may reflect as 
well state courts' greater comfort levels with the general 
comparative exercise; that is, of looking to other related sources 
of law and other articulators of law-in the federal courts and 
the other state courts-for assistance in reaching their own 
decisions. It is possible that these habits of mind in the state 
judiciary will also make it possible for state courts, like the 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in the private polygraph case and 
others, to begin to learn from comparative constitutional law 
and human rights law from courts around the world, to the 
extent they grapple with similar issues.91 
III. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
It is important to note the degree of transnational influence 
within U.s. constitutionalism, broadly understood as including 
decisions in state, territorial or commonwealth courts. It would 
be a mistake to think that national level governments are the 
only diffusers of transnational constitutionalism. Even if largely 
unnoticed in federal constitutional discourse, our subnational 
units have been learning, not only from other states and from 
federal decisions, . but also from the transnational and 
international constitutional discourse of human rights.92 But it 
the interpretation of federal rights. 
90. In federal constitutional interpretation, the U.S. Court has manifested some 
resistance to having its own constitutional interpretations informed by congressional 
views. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997); see also Vicki C. 
Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 153-55 (2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative 
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945-46 (2003). On statutory issues, by contrast, 
the Court has recently been reluctant to engage in purposive interpretation of federal 
remedial statutes, on grounds of at least purported deference to Congress. For critical 
discussion, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. 
REV. 343. 
91. Cf. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 13, at 634-38 (linking U.S. Court's 
skepticism towards congressional involvement in constitutional interpretation with its 
resistance to comparative constitutional learning). On state court receptivity to 
international or foreign sources of law on human rights, see infra note 92. 
92. Indeed, an increasing number of state courts have referred to such international 
or foreign sources of law on human rights. See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 
n.21 (Or. 1981) (Linde, J.) (interpreting state constitutional rule protecting prisoners 
against "unnecessary rigor" of confinement and referring to Universal Declaration of 
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is important also to note the relatively small inroads on 
discourse in Montana that the human dignity clause has had 
thus far, perhaps showing the influence of a dominant model of 
constitutional discourse derived from the U.S. Constitution, 
though one perhaps itself in the process of change.93 Given the 
appm:ently robust tradition in Puerto Rico and the possibilities 
for development in Montana, students of transnational human 
rights discourse would do well in the future to pay attention to 
the multiple fora for the development, diffusion, and articulation 
of foundational concepts of human dignity, looking not only to 
international, transnational and national sources but also to 
sub national entities that function with sufficient independence 
to develop their own lines of authority and reasoning.94 
Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European 
Convention on Human Rights as illuminating aspects of human dignity involved in such 
protection); Boehm v. Super. Ct., 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 502 (1986) (analyzing state 
statute concerning general assistance payments, quoting from Universal Declaration and 
enjoining certain administrative cutbacks in benefits); Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 
771, 780·82 (Conn. 1995) (peters, J., concurring) (discussing the Universal Declaration 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in concluding 
that, while state constitution should be construed to include right to minimal 
subsistence, the challenged statute was consistent with historic limitations on public 
support); State v. Wilder, 2000 ME 32, 4j[20, 748 A.2d 444, 4j[ 20 (reversing father's 
conviction for assaulting son; discussing British common law approach; contrasting 
European Court of Human Rights approach; concluding that under Maine law parents 
had right to administer moderate or reasonable punishment, even though nine countries 
in Europe ban corporeal punishment of children); Jones v. Florida, 740 So. 2d 520, 524· 
25 (Fla. 1999) (reversing conviction for failure to hold timely competency hearing in 
violation of Due Process Clause and Florida rule of criminal procedure and relying in 
part on Justice Breyer's opinions invoking foreign decisions on delay in carrying out 
death penalty, including the decision in Soering v. United Kingdom in the European 
Court of Human Rights, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlhudoc). 
93. In Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court overturned 
its own earlier decision and held unconstitutional a state law criminalizing consensual 
adult sodomy. The Montana court had reached this conclusion under its own 
constitution in 1997. The U.S. Court relied, in part, on European decisions, concluding 
that: ''The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of 
human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in this 
country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more 
legitimate or urgent." Id. at 2481·83. The Court also noted state court decisions, 
including that of the Montana court in Gryzcan, abolishing prohibitions on same sex 
sodomy. Id. at 2480. The U.S. Court's greater openness to comparative legal approaches 
to human rights may invite further exploration of these approaches by the state courts 
on state law issues. 
94. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 20, at 416 (urging state court attention to foreign and 
international law in interpreting state criminal procedure; "If a state court is persuaded 
that the state's people deserve no less liberty, fairness or humane treatment under its 
Bill of Rights than are received by citizens of other countries, it can so decide without 
concern about federal holdings or doctrines."). 
